This article examines Soviet and post-Soviet historiography on the origins of the Great War, paying special attention to the reverberations of western historiographical disputes in the Soviet Union and Russia. The author argues that Fischer’s th…
This article reflects on the development of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) briefly before describing how the software can be harnessed to aid the process of research. It shows how data from a multi-user project looking at…
This study traces the transnational interactions that contributed to introducing the low-carbon economy agenda into Chinese policymaking. A microprocessual two-level analysis (outside-in as well as inside-access) is employed to analyse transnational and domestic exchanges. The study provides evidence that low-carbon agenda-setting – introduced by transnational actors, backed by foreign funding, promoted by policy entrepreneurs from domestic research institutes, propelled by top-level attention, but only gradually and cautiously adopted by the government bureaucracy – can be considered a case of effective transnational diffusion based on converging perceptions of novel policy challenges and options. Opinion leaders and policy-brokers from the government-linked scientific community functioned as effective access points to the Chinese government’s policy agenda.
This study traces the transnational interactions that contributed to introducing the low-carbon economy agenda into Chinese policymaking. A microprocessual two-level analysis (outside-in as well as inside-access) is employed to analyse transnational and domestic exchanges. The study provides evidence that low-carbon agenda-setting – introduced by transnational actors, backed by foreign funding, promoted by policy entrepreneurs from domestic research institutes, propelled by top-level attention, but only gradually and cautiously adopted by the government bureaucracy – can be considered a case of effective transnational diffusion based on converging perceptions of novel policy challenges and options. Opinion leaders and policy-brokers from the government-linked scientific community functioned as effective access points to the Chinese government’s policy agenda.
In recent years, the security risk to Chinese citizens overseas has become an increasingly prominent issue owing to a rapid increase in the number of Chinese citizens moving and travelling abroad. Protecting the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens abroad has become a key priority within the overall field of protecting China’s overseas interests. This article uses an alternative sample analysis to perform a quantitative interpretation of the “Special Notices for Chinese Citizens Abroad” issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China from 2008 to 2010. It analyses the distribution characteristics of the risks posed to Chinese citizens overseas in terms of geographical distribution, various risk categories. Based on the results, the article concludes with a summation of the main features and causes of security risks to Chinese citizens overseas.
In recent years, the security risk to Chinese citizens overseas has become an increasingly prominent issue owing to a rapid increase in the number of Chinese citizens moving and travelling abroad. Protecting the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens abroad has become a key priority within the overall field of protecting China’s overseas interests. This article uses an alternative sample analysis to perform a quantitative interpretation of the “Special Notices for Chinese Citizens Abroad” issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China from 2008 to 2010. It analyses the distribution characteristics of the risks posed to Chinese citizens overseas in terms of geographical distribution, various risk categories. Based on the results, the article concludes with a summation of the main features and causes of security risks to Chinese citizens overseas.
Thirsty for oil and other raw materials needed to fuel its breakneck development, China is funnelling money and manpower into an expanding number of countries in order to secure access to natural resources. This effort has successfully increased Chinese oil assets overseas but it has also exposed Beijing and Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) to significant risks. The present paper focuses on one type of risk – political risk – and how it has affected China’s global quest for oil since 1993. It starts with a brief overview of political risk. It then looks at political risk management as applied to the oil industry in general. The paper continues with a discussion of the political risk management of Chinese national oil companies over time. This includes a concise exam-ination of several instances in which the interests of Chinese NOCs have been undermined due to political risk and the shortcomings in the approaches of Chinese NOCs to political risk. Recent developments suggest that Chinese NOCs are learning from these mistakes and adjusting their strategies accordingly. Although progress toward these readjust-ments has been made, China’s own socio-political context is still hampering the ability of Chinese NOCs to deal with on-the-ground realities that are clearly much more unstable than China’s own.
Thirsty for oil and other raw materials needed to fuel its breakneck development, China is funnelling money and manpower into an expanding number of countries in order to secure access to natural resources. This effort has successfully increased Chinese oil assets overseas but it has also exposed Beijing and Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) to significant risks. The present paper focuses on one type of risk – political risk – and how it has affected China’s global quest for oil since 1993. It starts with a brief overview of political risk. It then looks at political risk management as applied to the oil industry in general. The paper continues with a discussion of the political risk management of Chinese national oil companies over time. This includes a concise exam-ination of several instances in which the interests of Chinese NOCs have been undermined due to political risk and the shortcomings in the approaches of Chinese NOCs to political risk. Recent developments suggest that Chinese NOCs are learning from these mistakes and adjusting their strategies accordingly. Although progress toward these readjust-ments has been made, China’s own socio-political context is still hampering the ability of Chinese NOCs to deal with on-the-ground realities that are clearly much more unstable than China’s own.
Africa’s and South America’s rich endowments of resources and great need for infrastructure development make them perfect candidates for China’s “infrastructure-for-resources” loans. Over the past decade, such an arrangement for pursuing China’s resource-security goals overseas – namely, securing long-term supply contracts and accessing exploration rights – has proved more effective in Africa than in South America. This article discusses the reasons for this regional variation by providing a comparative study of China’s economic statecraft in Angola and Brazil, focusing on the deployment of infrastructure-for-oil deals. It argues that the variation in China’s energy-security outcomes (long-term supply and access to oil equity) in Angola and Brazil can be attributed mostly to fundamental differences between the institutional structures of each country’s oil industry. Although this foreign policy instrument has worked well for the centralised structure encountered in Angola, it has been less suitable for the far more liberalised and regulated environment that characterises Brazil’s oil sector.
Africa’s and South America’s rich endowments of resources and great need for infrastructure development make them perfect candidates for China’s “infrastructure-for-resources” loans. Over the past decade, such an arrangement for pursuing China’s resource-security goals overseas – namely, securing long-term supply contracts and accessing exploration rights – has proved more effective in Africa than in South America. This article discusses the reasons for this regional variation by providing a comparative study of China’s economic statecraft in Angola and Brazil, focusing on the deployment of infrastructure-for-oil deals. It argues that the variation in China’s energy-security outcomes (long-term supply and access to oil equity) in Angola and Brazil can be attributed mostly to fundamental differences between the institutional structures of each country’s oil industry. Although this foreign policy instrument has worked well for the centralised structure encountered in Angola, it has been less suitable for the far more liberalised and regulated environment that characterises Brazil’s oil sector.
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