Auditing Leviathan: Corruption and State Formation in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain
Administrative and financial corruption was a central preoccupation of eighteenth-century Britain, and effective audit supposedly the sine qua non of an efficient fiscal-military state, yet no studies exist of its true extent or why audit mechanisms could prove so ineffective. Through a close study of the papers of James Brydges, Paymaster of the Forces between 1705 and 1713 and ‘a byword for corruption’, this article argues that a variety of inventive means were used to bypass the Exchequer audit, including outright falsification and forgery. Yet the Exchequer was not ineffective, and ultimately political standing determined how far corruption was detected or deterred. Where Brydges could mobilise personal and political connections with the Exchequer and other bodies such as the Comptrollers of Army Accounts, he had more success at evading scrutiny. By contrast, although the parliamentary Commissioners of Public Accounts used arbitrary and relatively unsystematic audit procedures and were motivated mainly by partisan interests, this lent them political power and motivation and thereby increased the credibility of their investigations. Less assured of political protection, Brydges therefore ceased most of his activities. Thus effective audit was not primarily the product of more impartial, rational or bureaucratic administrative structures, as most historians have suggested, but of the relative political standing of auditors versus their opponents. This has profound implications for studies of corruption and auditing during the eighteenth century and its continuities with earlier practices, and for understanding the decisive changes that occured during the nineteenth century.
Quelle: http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/128/533/806?rss=1
Popular Politics in the Late Medieval City: York and Bruges
The city of York, England’s self-titled ‘second city’ in the late middle ages, was the site of persistent political conflict from the last quarter of the fifteenth century. The Flemish city of Bruges experienced a series of revolts in the same period. This article compares the patterns of popular politics in the two cities. Although dissimilar in governmental context, population size and commercial significance, their constitutional arrangements were much more comparable. The urban commons, organised and mobilised by the crafts, were at the centre of the major disturbances in each city. They had a distinctive reading of the urban constitution, which was nurtured in a guild environment among craftsmen and citizens. In York and Bruges, the crafts engaged in similar forms of collective action (petitioning, collective assembly and the occupation of public space), and revolt was the consequence of a pattern of corporate politics. The shared forms, goals and mentalities of popular protest in York and Bruges can provide an explanation of revolt which might apply not only to towns across late medieval Europe in which the political representation of the crafts was common but also, more generally, to those urban centres where a corporatist ethos flourished.
Quelle: http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/128/533/771?rss=1
Freemasonry and the Indian Parsi Community: A Late Meeting On the Level.
Quelle: https://www.equinoxpub.com/journals/index.php/JRFF/article/view/17814
Mittelweg 36 | 3/2013
Quelle: http://www.eurozine.com/journals/mittelweg36/issue/2013-07-25.html
Freemasonry and the Indian Parsi Community: A Late Meeting On the Level.
Quelle: https://www.equinoxpub.com/journals/index.php/JRFF/article/view/17814